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Article 8

NOTES
BEYOND MEDELLIN: RECONSIDERING
FEDERALISM LIMITS ON THE TREATY POWER
Benjamin Beite*
INTRODUCTION

The Constitution recognizes three sources of law as the supreme
law of the land: the Constitution itself, federal laws passed in pursuance of the Constitution, and treaties made under the authority of the
United States.' In addition to this recognition, the Constitution
places limits on the ability to create and modify the law through each
of these sources of law. Changes to the Constitution itself must be
made through a formal amendment process. 2 The legislative power is
limited by the enumeration of particular powers granted to Congress.3
The power to make treaties is vested in the President, and subject to
only one explicit limitation: a two-thirds vote in the Senate.4
Both statutes and treaties may become the supreme law of the
land, and they may even pursue the same ends. Why, then, are the
limits on the legislative power so different from the limits on the
treaty power? If principles of federalism impose limits on the power
of the federal government to legislate, does federalism constrain the
power to make treaties as well?5
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., Public Policy,
The College of William & Mary, 2007. Special thanks to Professors Rick Garnett and
Paolo Carozza for their insightful comments; my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law
Review for their collective efforts in helping to improve this Note; and my fianc6e,
Heather Heiser, for her patient love and support.
1 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 Id. art. V.
3 See id. art. I, § 8.
4 Id. art. II, § 2, para. 2.
5 Throughout this Note, I have used the term "federalism limits" to refer broadly
to structural considerations between the federal government and state governments.
This includes the concept of enumerated powers as judicially enforceable limits on
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The answer to this question was long thought to be settled by
Missouri v. Holland,6 a 1920 case that dealt with the power of Congress
to pass legislation implementing the 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds7 between the United States and Great Britain.
The majority opinion written by Justice Holmes held that "[i]f the
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute
under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government."8 Holmes went on to find that the Tenth
Amendment did not bar legislation implementing the treaty despite
the fact that regulation of migratory birds would be beyond the reach
of Congress's enumerated powers absent the treaty.9 In short, the
treaty power was not subject to federalism limits.
In light of recent shifts in the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence, it is not clear that Missouri v. Hollandwas decided correctly.
After largely abandoning judicial enforcement of federalism limits for
five decades following the New Deal, the Court in recent years has
returned to the idea of judicially enforceable federalism limits in a
number of areas, most notably the commerce power.' 0 With federalism limits emerging and reemerging in these other areas, the question
of whether federalism constrains the treaty power is again the subject
of debate.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Medellin v. Texas" may
have signaled the Court's willingness to enforce federalism limits on
the treaty power. While Medellin does not explicitly address Missoun v.
Holland, it does suggest a presumption against self-executing treaties-functionally, this is a presumption against preemption of state
law by international obligations. The questions regarding congressional power (and the continued validity of Missouri v. Holland)
remain open.
This Note aims to evaluate possible federalism limits on the treaty
power in the wake of Medelin. Part I takes a closer look at Missoun v.
Holland and precisely why it is problematic. Part II briefly traces the
the power of the federal government, principles of states' rights, and the concept of
sovereign immunity.
6 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
7 U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
8 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
9 Id. at 434. In fact, a 1913 law seeking the same regulation of migratory birds
had been held invalid by lower federal courts. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. The difference between the unconstitutional 1913 law and the implementing legislation upheld in Missouri v. Holland was that the latter was supported by a
treaty and therefore (in Holmes's view) valid. See infra Part I.A-B.
10 See infra Part II.A.
11 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
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death and return of judicially enforceable federalism limits from the
New Deal to the Rehnquist Court's "new federalism." Part III examines the emergence of Medellin's presumption against self-executing
treaties. Part IV evaluates the presumption against self-executing treaties and considers other possible limits on the treaty power.
I.

WHY MissouRi v. HOLLAND Is PROBLEMATIC

The Court in Missouri v. Hollandaddressed the power of Congress
to pass legislation implementing a treaty. The history of the case
shows that the treaty in question was specifically intended to enable
Congress to legislate beyond the limits of its enumerated powers. Justice Holmes's opinion thus upholds not only a broad view of the treaty
power, but also the idea that the federal government can increase the
power of Congress by treaty rather than by constitutional amendment.
This Part addresses the historical background of the case, the opinion
by Justice Holmes, and some of the problems posed by the decision.
A.

HistoricalBackground of Missouri v. Holland

Although the holding of Missouri v. Holland dealt with the power
of Congress to legislate pursuant to the 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty
with Great Britain, 1 2 the controversy actually began several years
earlier.13
Active efforts in Congress to pass legislation protecting migratory
birds began in 1904, ultimately succeeding in 1913.14 Opponents of
the legislation contended that protection of migratory birds exceeded
the powers delegated to the federal government and fell within the
police power reserved to state governments.1 5 Even proponents of the
legislation were unsure of its constitutionality.1 6
Federal district courts in Arkansas and Kansas1 8 agreed that the
Act of 1913 was an unconstitutional interference with the rights, pow12 Specifically, the case was a challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128,
40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2006)), a piece of
legislation implementing the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds.
13 For a detailed account of federal attempts to regulate migratory birds by statute and by treaty, see Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in HistoricalPerspective,
1975 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 77-101. See aloJOSEPH PAIGE, THE LAW NOBODY KNows 31-41
(1977) (providing historical and political context for Missouri v. Holland).
14 See Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847; Lofgren, supra note 13, at 78.
15 Lofgren, supra note 13, at 78.
16 Id. at 79 ("Senator George McLean, the sponsor of the bill which passed in
1913, was so unsure at first whether the legislation could stand on its own that he
introduced a constitutional amendment to validate it.").
17 United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
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ers, and property of the states.1 9 Seeking to prevent the eventual
invalidation of the Act of 1913 by the Supreme Court, the Senate
passed a resolution recommending negotiation of a treaty in order to
provide the federal government with the necessary authority to regulate migratory birds. 20 A treaty with Great Britain (on behalf of
Canada) was swiftly concluded and approved in 1916.21 This treaty
aimed to get around the potential invalidity; "if the United States and
Canada agreed to cooperate to protect the birds, Congress could
enact the legislation it had previously adopted under its power to do
what is 'necessary and proper' to implement the treaty."2 2 As Professor David Golove noted, "[i]f ever the federal government could be
charged with bad faith in making a treaty, this had to be the case." 23
B. justice Holmes's Opinion in Missouri v. Holland
In 1918, Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 2 4 to
implement its new treaty obligations. The 1918 Act was quickly challenged in court. Missouri v. Holland vindicated proponents of the
treaty: "[t] he treaty did make a difference in judicial outcome."2 5
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes noted that the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of powers not delegated to the federal government was no bar to the 1918 Act.2 6 There are three major steps in
Holmes's analysis-the validity of the statute, the validity of the treaty,
and the potential bar of the Tenth Amendment.
Since the power to make treaties is expressly vested in the federal
government by Article II of the Constitution and those treaties are the
supreme law of the land under Article VI, Holmes reasoned that the
statute must be valid if made pursuant to a valid treaty. 27 That is,
despite the fact that a statute would otherwise exceed the enumerated
18 United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 294-96 (D. Kan. 1915).
19 PAIGE, supra note 13, at 32.
20 Lofgren, supra note 13, at 81.
21 Id.; see Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug.
16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
22 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190 (2d
ed. 1996).
23 David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundationsof the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1256 (2000).
24 Ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711
(2006)).
25 Lofgren, supra note 13, at 102.
26 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920).
27 Id. at 432.
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powers of Congress, 28 it may be valid as a necessary and proper means
of implementing treaty obligations. 29
Despite the potential invalidity of the 1918 Act in the absence of a
treaty, Holmes determined that the limits on the treaty power are not
identical to the limits on congressional power.30 Under Article VI,
statutes are the supreme law of the land when made in pursuance of
the Constitution.3 1 Treaties, on the other hand, are supreme when
made under the authority of the United States.3 2 To Holmes, this distinction suggested different limits on the power to legislate and the
power to make treaties.3 3
In the absence of any express prohibition in the Constitution
against such a treaty, the only question for Holmes was whether the
treaty was "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general
terms of the Tenth Amendment."3 4 In Missouri v. Holland, the treaty
presented a conflict between a weak state interest and a strong federal
interest. Missouri's claim was premised on the presence of migratory
birds within its jurisdiction, but "[w] ild birds are not in the possession
of anyone."3 5 Balanced against this weak state interest, Holmes took a
broad view of federal interests. Since protective regulation of such
birds could only be achieved at the national and international level,
the federal interest was greater.3 6 Since the treaty and statute in ques28 Lofgren notes that the district court in Missouri v. Holland "agreed that the
1918 law would have been unconstitutional were it not enacted pursuant to a treaty."
Lofgren, supra note 13, at 102.
29 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. Holmes's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause has been called "[t] he least controversial holding of Holland." CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMYTH, FoREIGN RELATIONs LAw 419 (2d ed. 2006).
But see
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1867,
1880-92 (2005) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants only the power
to make laws necessary and proper to the creation of treaties, not the power to carry
the provisions of those treaties into effect).
30 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. (comparing the power to legislate and the power to make treaties and concluding that limits on the treaty power "must be ascertained in a different way").
34 Id. at 434.
35 Id.
36 Part of Holmes's test for evaluating the validity of a treaty is whether the treaty
governs matters requiring national action. Id. at 433. Holmes's emphasis on the status of the United States as "'a nation'" rather than "'an organism'" in the post-Civil
War era made it easier to assert a national interest in the protection of migratory
birds. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the ConstitutionalRegime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1, 69 (1999) (quoting Holland, 252 U.S. at 433). White notes

that this argument "seemed directed more toward confirming the breadth of the
treaty power than to ascertaining any limitations on it, since the power could now be
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tion were otherwise valid means of achieving this national goal, the
Tenth Amendment in Holmes's view was no bar to the treaty or its
implementing legislation.3 7
C.

Problems Posed by Missouri v. Holland

The Court's decision that the treaty power is not subject to Tenth
Amendment limits has endured for nearly nine decades, but it has not
been without its critics. Michael D. Ramsey describes the impact of
Missouri v. Holland:
[T]he Supreme Court ... came close to saying there are no constitutional limits on treaties' subject matter. That conclusion, though,
has worried advocates of a meaningful federal system, both before
and after Holland. It seems to strike at the very idea of limited
national powers-that, as Madison said, the national government's
powers are "few and defined."3 8
The end result of Missouri v. Hollandis that when the federal government is unsure of the constitutionality of a statute, it can simply enter
into a treaty on that subject to enlarge the power of Congress to
address the previously invalid issue.3 9
Missouri v. Hollandalso had the unfortunate effect of resurrecting
the myth that treaties are not subject to any constitutional limits 40 by
emphasizing that federal statutes are supreme when made in pursuance of the Constitution, whereas treaties are supreme when made
under the authority of the United States. 4 1 The difference in wording
was intended to make clear that existing treaties at the time of the
Constitution's ratification would continue to be enforced. 4 2 The sugtaken to extend to subjects that the drafters of the Treaty Clause did not view as
matters of national concern." Id.
37 Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
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(2007) (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 296 (James Madison)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)).
39 See Lofgren, supra note 13, at 101-02 ("Proponents of the 1913 bird protection
law had themselves been uncertain of its constitutionality, but saw a treaty as offering
a firm foundation.").
40 CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHoZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 163-65 (2004). Even
Holmes did not go so far as to claim that treaties were not subject to any constitutional limits at all, cautioning that "[w]e do not mean to imply that there are no
qualifications to the treatymaking power; but they must be ascertained in a different
way." Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
41 DRAHoZAL, supra note 40, at 163.
42 Id. at 158-59. By requiring federal statutes to be made in pursuance of the
Constitution, only the statutes passed by the new constitutional government, and not
those passed under the Articles of Confederation, would be the supreme law of the

20101

BEYOND

MEDELLIN

1 16g

gestion that treaties need not be made in pursuance of the Constitution (and therefore are not bound by its limits) was seized upon by
Antifederalists in the ratification debate.4 3 Holland resurrected this
myth for the modem era, and it has proved persistent.4 4 The
Supreme Court has since clarified in several cases that treaties may
not violate individual constitutional rights,4 5 but the myth is damaging
nonetheless.
In addition to concerns at the federal level, the treaty power
unconstrained by federalism leaves the door open for Congress to legislate pursuant to treaties in areas traditionally governed by state lawjust as it did in Missouri v. Holland. For example, it has been suggested
that the federal government could enable itself to abolish the death
penalty at the state level by ratifying the Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 4 6 Another
possibility is that the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights4 7 (CCPR) itself (to which the United States is already a party)
could serve as the basis for reenacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 48 (RFRA)
a federal statute invalidated in part by City of
land. By recognizing all treaties made under the authority of the United States as the
supreme law of the land, existing treaties as well as future treaties would be enforced
under the Constitution. Id. at 159-61.
43 Id. at 164.
44 Id. at 163-64. In 1952, future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated:
"Treaties . .. can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the
President; they can take powers away from the States and give them to the
Federal Government or to some international body, and they can cut across
the rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights."
Id. at 163 (quotingJohn Foster Dulles, Address at the Regional Meeting of the American Bar Association in Louisville, Kentucky (April 11, 1952)).
45 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (holding that First Amendment limitations apply to the treaty power); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957)
(holding that the requirements of the Fifth Amendment limit the treaty power).
46 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414; see BRADLEY & GOLDSMYTH, Supra
note 29, at 419.
47 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
48 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
49 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONsT. COMMENT. 33 (1997) (analyzing how Congress might be able to enact a statute like RFRA
that protects religious freedom by relying on its power to implement treaty obligations). Neuman concluded that "CCPR Article 18 probably does not provide a proper
basis for upholding RFRA as enacted in 1993, although it would support a verbatim
reenactment of the statute if Congress so chose." Id. at 53.
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II.

THE DEATH AND RETURN OF FEDERALISM LIMITS

A possible explanation for the Court's broad view of the treaty
power in Missouri v. Holland is the increasingly broad view of federal
power in general that became apparent with the Court's expansive
reading of the Commerce Clause in the 1930s. By the early 1940s, it
was clear that the Court had shifted to a more deferential approach in
both practice and rhetoric.5 1 Breaking from earlier cases that invalidated legislation for regulating intrastate rather than interstate commerce 52 or for regulating activity that was not truly commercial,5 3 the
New Deal Court "ushered in an era of virtually unlimited federal legislative power."5 4
A. Federalism Limits on the Commerce Power

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.55 marked the beginning of
the movement toward plenary federal legislative power.5 6 There, the
Court held that the Commerce Power could reach any activity that
had an effect on interstate commerce, even if the source of the injury
was not itself an interstate commercial activity.5 7 The deference suggested by Jones & Laughlin Steel became more apparent in United States
v. Darby.5 8 Darby's "bootstrap" approach allowed Congress to regulate
noneconomic activities by prohibiting interstate shipment of a good
and then regulating the activity to enforce the prohibition.5 9 Notably,
Darby also rejected the idea of a Tenth Amendment limitation on the
legislative power, holding that the Tenth Amendment stated a truism
but did not serve as an independent limit on federal power.6 0 Wickard
50 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Note that the hypothetical reenactment of RFRA is analogous to Missouri v. Holland: a federal statute was struck down as exceeding the powers
of Congress, but the same statute would be valid if enacted pursuant to a valid treaty.
51 See BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 212-19 (1998).
52 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895) (holding
that the manufacturing of sugar was a local activity rather than interstate commerce
and therefore beyond the reach of the commerce power).
53 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (distinguishing
between the manufacture of goods and commerce).
54 RicHARD E. LEVY, THE POWER TO LEGIsLATE 57 (2006).
55 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
56 LEVY, supra note 54, at 60.
57 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31-32.
58 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
59 LEVY, supra note 54, at 61.
60 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 123-24; LEVY, supra note 54, at 61.
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v. Filbum6' solidified the Court's emerging deference on the scope of
the commerce power. Under the aggregating approach of Wickard,
even noneconomic local activity could be reached by the commerce
power if the activity in the aggregate has a substantial economic
effect.6 2 This expansive view of the commerce power "appeared ...
sufficiently broad to justify any federal regulation of any activity," and
it would be fifty years before the Court struck down another law for
exceeding the scope of the commerce power.6
In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has shown a renewed
interest in judicial enforcement of federalism limits, 6 4 striking down
laws for exceeding the enumerated powers of Congress for the first
time since the New Deal. In United States v. Lopez, 65 the Court struck
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act 6 6 for not having sufficient relation to interstate commerce. 67 Following the Lopez analysis, United
States v. Morrison68 invalidated provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act, 69 making clear that courts would defer less to legislative
findings when the regulated activities were within the traditional
police powers of the state. 70
While the Rehnquist Court's new federalism was a revolution in
federalism doctrine, it failed to "revolutionize the actual scope of
national power." 7 ' Deference was not entirely cast aside, nor was the
idea that individual activity could be reached by the commerce
61 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
62 See id. at 125; LEvy, supra note 54, at 61. Examining Justice Jackson's writings
on Wickard, Professor Barry Cushman concluded that the aggregating approach was
the product of a New Deal Court that had given up earlier efforts to find judicially
enforceable limits on congressional power. See CusHMAN, supra note 51, at 212-19.
63 LEVY, supra note 54, at 61-62. In the meantime, federal courts found a new
role as protectors of individual rights. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (establishing a heightened standard ofjudicial review for
actions aimed at discrete and insular minorities).
64 LEvy, supranote 54, at 66. For a more detailed description of the New Federalism than I have attempted here, see Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11-23 (2003).
65 514 U.S. 549 (1994).
66 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990), invalidated by
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
67 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
68 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69 Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.), invalidatedin part by Morrison, 529 U.S.
598.
70 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-19; LEVY, supra note 54, at 67.
71 MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 250 (2005).
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power- Gonzales v. Raich7 2 applied Wickard's aggregating approach to
uphold federal laws prohibiting the growth of medical marijuana for
personal use.73 Rather than a revolution in the scope of national
power, the new federalism has simply curbed some of the excesses in
national power. 74
The Commerce Clause was not the only area of law affected by
the revitalization of judicially enforceable federalism limits. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has applied principles of federalism to
restrain the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power,7 5 to prohibit federal commandeering of state governments, 7 6 and to affirm
the sovereign immunity of states from suit.7 7
B. Missouri v. Holland and the New Federalism
The central holding of Missouri v. Holland, that "[m]any matters . . . may appear to be 'reserved to the States' as regards domestic
legislation .. . but they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude
their regulation by international agreement," has been consistently
upheld since its decision.7 8 But the return of judicially enforceable
federalism limits in other areas of law has sparked intense debate
among scholars over whether such limits should apply to the treaty
72 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
73 See id. at 17-22; LEvy, supra note 54, at 67.
74 TUSHNET, supra note 71, at 277.
75 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedial and preventive
measures, and enforcement measures must be congruent to the ends achieved. See
also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737-40 (2003) (upholding
authorization of money damage suits against state governments on the basis of the
showing of congruence and proportionality in the record); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (finding that the legislative record must
reflect a pattern of irrational discrimination by state authorities); Morrison, 529 U.S. at
619-21 (holding that Section 5 enforcement measures must be directed at the state
rather than at the individual).
76 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62 (1992) (prohibiting federal commandeering of state legislatures); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 918-23, 935 (1997) (prohibiting federal commandeering of state law enforcement officials).
77 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) ("[N]otwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce
Clause does not grant Congress that power, and therefore § 2710(d) (7) cannot grant
jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued."); see also Garrett,531 U.S. at
379 n.9 (recognizing that other means of enforcing Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act are not precluded by the Court's holding that Congress did not validly
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity).
78 HENKIN, supra note 22, at 191.
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power as well. 7 9 Professor Curtis Bradley's 1998 article8 o is widely
credited as the first major entry in this debate. Questioning the conventional wisdom that federalism limits do not apply to treaties (a
position that Professor Bradley refers to as the nationalist view of the
treaty power), Professor Bradley argues that a plenary treaty power visA-vis the states would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's new
federalism.8 1 In Professor Bradley's view, "the treaty power should be
subject to the same federalism limitations" as the legislative powers of
Congress. 82
A wide range of scholars have weighed in on the issue. The
nationalist argument is best exemplified by Professor David Golove,
who responded directly to Professor Bradley.8 3 Defending Holland,
Professor Golove argues that the Treaty Clause is an unqualified grant
of power vested entirely in the President and the Senate. 8 4 Accordingly, legislation to implement a treaty obligation is within the power
of Congress to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the national government's treaty power.8 5 Nationalists also
argue that federalism limits on the treaty power are unnecessaryindividual rights provisions like the First Amendment are already recognized as limits on the treaty power 8 6 and the political process
should provide any other necessary checks.87 Finally, nationalists dis79 For an excellent discussion of the debate, see Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: ForgingNew Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1327,
1333-52 (2006).
80 Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power andAmerican Federalism,97 MICH. L. REv. 390
(1998).
81 Id. at 392-94.
82 Id. at 450.
83 Golove, supranote 23, at 1278-313. For additional arguments for the nationalist view of the treaty power, see generally Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding,and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land, "99 CoLum.
L. REv. 2095 (1999) (arguing that the original understanding of the treaty power was
that treaties are self-executing and become the supreme law of the land when
enacted); Carlos Manuel Vzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154
(1999) (arguing that all valid treaties have the same force as domestic law).
84 Golove, supra note 23, at 1089-91.
85 Id. at 1099-100. As Professor Golove notes, the Necessary and Proper Clause
allows Congress to carry into execution its own legislative powers and "'all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.'" Id. at 1099 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). Regardless of the fact that the power to make treaties is
found in Article II rather than Article I, Congress has the power to carry it into effect.
Id. at 1099-100.
86 Id. at 1097.
87 Id. at 1099.
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tinguish between the purpose of a treaty and its price; since domestic
regulations are the price paid for making treaties rather than the purpose of the treaty itself, the treaty power should result in minimal
domestic interference.8 8
The nationalist arguments fail to adequately address the realities
of the political process as well as the changes in the structure of government since the drafting of the Treaty Clause. Professor Golove
argues that domestic regulations are concessions made by the federal
government in order to protect an interest in the international
sphere,8 9 but even he acknowledges that Missoui v. Hollandinvolved a
bad faith use of the treaty power.9 0 The political reality recognized by
the Framers is that liberty cannot depend on the good faith of politicians-why should this be any less true in the context of treaties? In
addition, the institutional protections for states that existed when the
Treaty Clause was drafted were distorted with the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.9 1 While the interests of the state will sometimes coincide with the interests of the people in that state, the
popular election of senators lessens their incentive to be responsive to
state government.
Professor Bradley and the new federalists claim additional support from the Supreme Court's return to judicially enforceable federalism limits.9 2 This reliance is justified given the parallels between the
Court's treatment of the commerce power and the treaty power. The
Court was unwilling to enforce federalism limits on the treaty power
in Missouri v. Holland,just as it became unwilling to enforce federalism limits on the commerce power after Wickard v. Filburn. Both the
treaty power and the commerce power were interpreted as broad,
almost plenary powers over the subsequent decades. The Court continued to enforce individual-rights limits on congressional legislation,9 3 just as it did in treaty cases. 94 With the return of judicially
enforceable federalism limits on the commerce power in Lopez and
88 Id. at 1093.
89 See id. at 1091-92.
90 See id. at 1256.
91 Bradley, supra note 80, at 442 (describing the Senate's original role as providing direct representation for state governments).
92 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 80, at 400; Hollis, supra note 79, at 1350; Edward
T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 403, 420
(2003); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1982-83 (1999).
93 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
94 See supra note 45.
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Raich, it seems equally appropriate that federalism would impose
some similar limitations on the treaty power.
III.

EMERGING FEDERALISM LIMrrs IN RECENT CASES

A.

What Are We Looking for?

Just as the other new federalism developments "do not appear to
signal a return to the pre-New Deal jurisprudence of the federal legislative power,"9 5 a new federalist approach to the treaty power would
not mean a return to pre-Holland jurisprudence. After Raich, the
Court remains willing to allow regulation of noneconomic activity that
in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Lopez holds that this effect may not be too remote, but Filburn remains
untouched. If the Commerce Clause is any guide, the new federalism
will generate a similar limit on the treaty power. Such a limit would
provide some additional consideration of state interests while leaving
Holland largely untouched.
One possible means of imposing a federalism limit while stopping
short of reversing Holland would be to adopt a presumption against
preemption of state law by treaties. In the legislative area, the
Supreme Court has adopted a presumption against preemption of
state law by federal statutes.9 6 This presumption typically applies in
areas of law traditionally occupied by the states but not in areas of law
traditionally occupied by the federal government.9 7
The case law is mixed as to whether the presumption against preemption should apply in the treaty context,9 8 and not all treaties are
created equal. Some are "self-executing," meaning that they are
enforceable as domestic law immediately upon ratification.9 9 Others
are "non-self-executing," meaning that they require implementing legislation in order to become binding in domestic law and not merely
an international obligation.1 00 The distinction is longstanding,
originating in Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neil95
96

LEVY, supra note 54, at 66.
DRAHozAL, supra note 40, at 159.

97

Id.

98 Id. Compare United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (noting that treaties should be read to minimally impact the "authority and jurisdiction" of the states),
and Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938) ("Even the language of
a treaty wherever reasonably possible will be construed so as not to override state laws
or to impair rights arising under them."), with El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S.
155, 174-76 (1999) (allowing a treaty to preempt otherwise applicable state law in the
interest of uniformity).
99 DRAHozAL, supra note 40, at 161.
100 Id.
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son.101 By definition, only self-executing treaties preempt inconsistent
state law.10 2 Thus, any analysis of whether a treaty preempts state law
must begin with the question of whether the treaty is self-executing.10 3
A line of recent cases, beginning with Breardv. Greenel0 4 and culminating in Medellin v. Texas, suggests a presumption against self-executing treaties. Since a treaty must be self-executing in order to
preempt state law, this effectively functions as a broad presumption
against preemption in the treaty context.10 5
B.

The Road to Medellfn

1. Treaties Involved in the Breard-Medellfn Line of Cases
The cases leading up to Medellin address three related treaties.
Before examining the emerging presumption against self-executing
treaties, a brief explanation of these international obligations is
necessary.
These cases also share the same general fact pattern. The petitioners in each case are foreign nationals who have been tried and
convicted by American courts for crimes committed in the United
States. The petitioners are seeking to enforce the rights granted by
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations'0 6 (Vienna Convention). Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that, if a person
detained by a foreign country requests, "the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of
the sending State" of such detention, and "inform the [detainee] without delay of his right[ ]" to request assistance from the consul of his
own state.1 07 In each case, the petitioner asserts a denial of his right
to consular notification granted by the Vienna Convention, and
claims error in his conviction as a result.
In addition to the Vienna Convention itself, the United States was
a party to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consu101
102

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 29, at 335; accord DRAHOZAL, supra note 40,

at 161.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 29, at 335.
104 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
105 In the case of a self-executing treaty, inconsistent state law is preempted by the
treaty itself. In the case of a non-self-executing treaty, any displacement of state law
comes as a result of implementing legislation passed by Congress rather than from
the treaty itself.
106 Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
107 Id.art. 36(1)(b).
103
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lar Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 1os
(Optional Protocol) at the time of these claimed denials. 09 Signatories of the Optional Protocol specifically consent to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over disputes
arising from the Vienna Convention. 10
Finally, the United States has an obligation under the United
Nations Charter. Article 94(1) of the Charter provides that "[e]ach
Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.""'
In each case, then, there are potentially three treaty obligations at
stake-the Vienna Convention, the Optional Protocol, and the U.N.
Charter. The United States must inform foreign nationals of their
right to consular notification upon arrest. For any dispute over the
meaning of this right, the United States has consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Further, the United States is under an international
obligation as a member of the United Nations to comply with the ICJ's
decision in each case. 12
2.

An Emerging Limit
a.

Breard v. Greene

Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay living in Virginia,
was convicted on charges of rape and capital murder and sentenced
to death." 3 After unsuccessfully appealing his convictions, Breard
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,
arguing for the first time that his convictions should be overturned
because of alleged violations of the Vienna Convention-specifically,
that the arresting authorities in Virginia failed to inform him of his
right to contact the Paraguayan consulate." 4 This claim was unsuccessful in the American courts, with the Fourth Circuit upholding the
district court's determination that Breard had procedurally defaulted
108 Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional
Protocol].
109 The United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005. See
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008) (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice,
U.S. Sec'y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Sec'y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005)).
110 Optional Protocol, supra note 108. art. I.
111 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
112 Hollis notes that "[t]he most dramatic examples [of federalism playing a role
in executive treaty practice at the enforcement stage] have occurred in the context of
what remedial rights individual defendants obtain for violations of [Vienna Convention] article 36." Hollis, supra note 79, at 1384.
113 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1998) (per curiam).
114 Id. at 373.
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on his Vienna Convention claim when he failed to raise it in state
court and could not demonstrate cause or prejudice. 1 5
In 1998, Paraguay filed a suit against the United States in the
International Court of Justice alleging violations of the Vienna Convention in connection with Breard's arrest." 6 Noting its jurisdiction,
the ICJ issued an order asking "the United States [to] 'take all measures at its disposal to-ensure that . . . Breard [was] not executed

pending the [ICJ's] final decision.""' 7 Breard then filed a habeas
petition with the Supreme Court, asking the Court to grant a stay of
execution to enforce the ICJ's order."r8
The Supreme Court rejected the claim by Breard and Paraguay
that the Vienna Convention, as the supreme law of the land, trumps a
state's procedural default rules."19 While this result seems consistent
with a new federalist approach to treatymaking, Breard did not settle
the debate-in fact, Breard avoided the most pressing questions in the
treaty debate despite upholding state procedural rules over a claimed
treaty violation.
The Breard Court hinted at possible federalism limits in affirming
that "the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State."' 20 The result in Breardwas bolstered
by the Court's recognition of a supervening federal statute. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act'21 (AEDPA) was passed
in 1996, requiring a habeas petitioner alleging treaty violations to
develop the factual basis of the claim in state court proceedings.1 22
Although the Vienna Convention was the supreme law of the land, it
remained subject to the last-in-time rule.12 3 To the extent that the
Vienna Convention required otherwise, it was supplanted by AEDPA.
While supportive of state procedural rules, Breard did not make
any clear statement on the scope of the treaty power. Allowing imple115 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618-19, 621 (4th Cir. 1998).
116 Breard, 523 U.S. at 374.
117 Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9)).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 375.
120 Id.
121 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
122 Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
123 Id. The last-in-time rule is a principle of interpretation that means exactly
what it says: when there is a conflict between two sources of law and both sources are
the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause, the most recent source
controls. DRAHOZAL, supra note 40, at 162. Commonly, the last-in-time rule results in
a later federal statute overriding an earlier treaty, as it did in this case. Id.
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mentation at the state level and recognizing a more recent conflicting
federal statute, the Court did not truly have to decide a conflict
between treaty obligations and federalism values. For meaningful federalism limits on the treaty power to emerge, the Court would have to
make a stronger statement.
The preliminary ICJ order at issue in Breard did not state a particularly strong international obligation-the United States was asked to
take all measures at its disposal to stay the execution until the ICJ case
was completed.1 24 In a federal system, the measures available to the
national government to constrain a state government are necessarily
limited. It is also worth noting that Breard involved a preliminary
order from the ICJ rather than a final order, and that Breard's convictions had been finalized for five years before Paraguay brought the ICJ
suit.

b.

LaGrand and Avena

After the Supreme Court's decision in Breard, two ICJ cases
addressed the conflict between the Vienna Convention and the procedural default rule. In LaGrand Case,125 the ICJ held:
In itself, the [procedural default] rule does not violate Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention. The problem arises when the procedural
default rule does not allow the detained individual to challenge a
conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the competent national authorities
failed to comply with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information 'without delay', thus preventing the person from
seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending
State.126

Avena and Other Mexican Nationas12 7 involved an alleged violation
of the Vienna Convention by the United States in the arrest, detention, trial, conviction, and death sentences of fifty-four Mexican
nationals.1 28 Mexico claimed that the United States had an international legal obligation not to apply the procedural default rule (or any
other doctrine of municipal law, for that matter) to preclude the exercise of rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 129 Building
on its logic in LaGrand, the ICI agreed. In both cases, the ICJ held
124
125
126
127
128
129

Breard, 523 U.S. at 374.
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
Id. at 497.
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
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that the application of the procedural default rule would prevent
effective challenges to the convictions and sentences except on
United States constitutional grounds.1 30
The ICJ held in Avena that the United States must provide a remedy to give "review and reconsideration" of the convictions and
sentences alleged to violate Article 36.131 The ICJ was careful to point
out that rights under Article 36 are independent of due process rights
under the U.S. Constitution, so "what is crucial in the review and
reconsideration process is the existence of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in
the Vienna Convention."1 3 2
The Avena decision represents an obligation for the United States
in international law, but one that is more demanding than the one at
stake in Breard. Avena was a final decision of the ICJ rather than a
request for stay of execution to allow for an additional hearing. Not
only is it a stronger international obligation than that in Breard, but
Avena arguably implicates a greater state interest than Breard. Where
Breardasked for a temporary stay of execution, compliance with Avena
would mean providing "review and reconsideration" of criminal convictions in state courts without regard to state procedural rules. In
addition to the state's clear interest in the procedural rules of its court
system, the ICJ's order in Avena reached fifty-one named foreign
nationals rather than a single individual. Perhaps unsurprisingly, federal courts have been reluctant to implement the ICJ's ruling.
c.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon

The first test of the international obligation to comply with Avena
came in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.13 3 The Supreme Court held that
despite the ICJ's ruling in Avena, claims of Article 36 violations would
continue to be controlled by Breard v. Greene.134 Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national convicted of murder in Oregon state court,
claimed that he would not have made incriminating statements to
police had he been informed that he could ask to have the Mexican
consulate notified of his detention.' 3 5 On that ground, Sanchez-Llamas unsuccessfully sought suppression of those statements. 3 6 His
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 57.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 65.
548 U.S. 331 (2006).
Id. at 360.
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
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claims were heard at the Supreme Court with those of Mario Bustillo,
a Honduran national convicted of murder in Virginia state court.13 7
Bustillo argued for the first time in a habeas petition that he had not
been informed that he could request consular notification, but found
this claim barred by the procedural default rule.1 38
The substance of Bustillo's claim was that the ICJ decisions in
LaGrand and Avena interpreted the Vienna Convention as requiring
American courts to allow Article 36 claims in spite of procedural
default rules.' 3 9 The Supreme Court was not persuaded. Writing for
the majority, ChiefJustice Roberts conceded that "the ICJ's interpretation deserves 'respectful consideration,"' but insisted that "it does not
compel us to reconsider our understanding of the Convention in
Breard."14 0

In declining to adopt the ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna Convention, the Court emphasized the nonbinding nature of ICJ decisions. Under the Statute of the International Court ofJustice1 41 (IC
Statute), ICJ decisions have no binding force except between parties
and in respect of that particular case, and ICJ interpretations are not
binding precedent even to the ICJ itself. 142 Even the contemplated
remedy for noncompliance-referral to the U.N. Security Council-is
political rather than judicial.1 4 3
Moreover, the Supreme Court was alarmed by the ICJ's treatment
of procedural default rules. Procedural default rules are an important
part of an adversarial system which relies on the parties to raise
issues.1 44 Giving "full effect" to Article 36 as interpreted by the ICJ
would trump not just procedural default rules, but also other rules,
including statutes of limitations and prohibitions against successive
habeas petitions.1 4 5 Such a broad proposition cannot be reconciled
with the treaty's explicit requirement that Article 36 rights must be
exercised "'in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiv1 46
ing State.'
Despite the decisions in LaGrandeand Avena, the Supreme Court
remained unwilling to back down from its protection of the procedu137 Id. at 340-41.
138 Id. at 341-42.
139 See id. at 351-53.
140 Id. at 353 (quoting Breard v. Gieene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)).
141 June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
142 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 354-55.
143 Id. at 355.
144 Id. at 356-57.
145 Id. at 357.
146 Id. (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 106, art. 36).
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ral default rule in Breard. With state procedural default rules prevailing over an explicit, affirmative international obligation, an emerging
federalism limit starts to become more plausible.
C. Medellin v. Texas
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Medellin v. Texas builds
on the earlier decisions in Breard and Sanchez-Llamas. Unlike these
earlier cases, in Medellin, the Court was asked to decide a conflict
between state procedural default rules and an international obligation
that not only involved the petitioner directly but that the executive
branch sought to enforce in domestic law. This combination of factors made Medellin an ideal case to determine whether the earlier
cases reflected an emerging federalism limit on the treaty power.
Jose Ernesto Medellin was one of the Mexican nationals named
in Avena.1 4 7 Medellin had been convicted of murder and sentenced
to death in Texas state court.'4 8 Following the ICJ's ruling in Avena,
Medellin sought review and reconsideration of his conviction and sentence through a habeas petition in state court, arguing that his earlier
failure to raise his Vienna Convention claim was no bar given the ICJ's
ruling. 149 In addition, the Bush administration had indicated its support for Avena-a Memorandum to the Attorney General from President George W. Bush stated that the United States would "discharge
its international obligations under [Avena] by having State courts give
effect to the decision."1 50 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's habeas application as an abuse of the writ, insisting
that Medellin's Vienna Convention claim was barred by his failure to
raise it in a timely manner.1 5 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions. First,
the Court considered whether Avena was directly enforceable as
domestic law in state court. 152 Second, the Court considered whether
the President's Memorandum independently required states to set
147 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter President's Memorandum] (on file with
author). The claim that the United States can "discharge its international obligations
under the Avena case 'by having state courts give effect to the decision in accordance
with general principles of comity'" appears to rest on the international obligation to
comply with ICJ decisions. See Hollis, supra note 79, at 1386 (quoting President's
Memorandum, supra).
151 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
152 Id.
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aside state procedural default rules to provide review and reconsideration of claims by the Mexican nationals named in Avena.15 3 The
majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts concluded that "neither
Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that preempts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions." 154 The implication of this conclusion for
federalism limits on the treaty power is the question to which we now
turn.
1. The Presumption Against Self-Executing Treaties in Medellin
A presumption against self-executing treaties emerges from
Medellin as a federalism limit on the treaty power. Functionally, this is
a presumption against preemption of state law by international obligations. 15 5 The following analysis is framed by the two questions
presented to the Court-whether Avena is directly enforceable as
domestic law in state court and whether the President's Memorandum
independently requires states to provide "review and reconsideration"
in spite of state procedural rules.
a.

Enforcing Avena as Domestic Law

The Court's first line of inquiry deals with whether the ICJ's
Avena judgment is directly enforceable as domestic law in state courts.
While the Court recognizes that compliance with Avena constitutes an
obligation on the United States in international law, "not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law
enforceable in United States courts." 156
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Medell(n's presumption against self-execution has both federalism and separation of powers dimensions. On its face, a presumption against self-execution is primarily a separation of powers issue-it is concerned with the balance of power between
the President and Congress in determining when treaty obligations are directly
enforceable in domestic law. In separation-of-powers terms, the presumption against
self-execution could be viewed as a presumption against removal of the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of legislation.
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, a presumption against self-execution may be viewed in federalism terms as a presumption against preemption of state
law. Although the shift toward Congress may be driven by separation-of-powers concerns, the presumption against self-execution will ultimately require more of the federal government, and therefore is fairly characterized as a federalism limit.
156 Id. at 1356.

1 184

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

85-3

The crucial determination in this regard is whether or not the
treaty is self-executing.1 57 Since there is clearly no implementing legislation in this case, Avena is only directly enforceable in American
courts if ICJ opinions are self-executing. If this were not a difficult
enough bar, the Court adopts whatJustice Stevens refers to in his concurrence as a "presumption against self-execution."1 58 That is, the
majority assumes that a treaty is not self-executing unless there is clear
evidence to the contrary. The consequence of this presumption is a
default position that state law prevails over contradictory treaty
obligations.
Turning then to the treaties themselves, the Court found nothing
in the Optional Protocol, 159 the U.N. Charter,16 0 or the ICJ Statute 61
to suggest that ICJ decisions are self-executing. If anything, the treaties suggest the opposite conclusion-the Optional Protocol provides
only a bare grant of jurisdiction,16 2 the U.N. Charter contemplates
only diplomatic remedies for noncompliance,1 6 3 and the ICJ Statute
leaves no room for an individual to be a party to an ICJ proceeding. 164
In short, the treaties themselves are ambiguous or suggest that ICJ
decisions are not self-executing, and neither conclusion is sufficient to
override the Court's presumption against self-execution.
b.

The President's Memorandum

The Court's second line of inquiry deals with whether the President's Memorandum independently requires state courts to provide
"review and reconsideration" of Medellin's claims despite state procedural rules. While acknowledging that the President may act to comply with an international treaty obligation, the Court held that "the
non-self-executing character of a treaty constrains the President's ability to comply with treaty commitments by unilaterally making the
treaty binding on domestic courts."1 65
157 Recall that this determination is a necessary prerequisite for a treaty to preempt state law of its own force. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
158 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 1358 (majority opinion).
160 Id. at 1358-59.
161 Id. at 1360.
162 Id. at 1358.
163 Id. at 1359.
164 Id. at 1360.
165 Id. at 1371. The oral argument transcript reveals the Justices' concern with the
scope of executive power. Justice Scalia characterized the government's argument as
"telling us that, well, we don't need the Congress; the President can make a domestic
law by writing a memo to his Attorney General." Transcript of Oral Argument at
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The majority's analysis of presidential power is framed by the
familiar categories of Justice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyeri 66 :
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate....
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain....
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb .. 167
While recognizing the President's unique qualifications to resolve
sensitive foreign policy decisions and the "plainly compelling" interest
in protecting international relations through mutual treaty compliance, the Court nonetheless found that "[s]uch considerations . .. do
not allow us to set aside first principles." 168 Applying the Youngstown
framework, the majority determined that the President's Memorandum fell under the third category-presidential action incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress. 16 9 By definition, a nonself-executing treaty is ratified with the understanding that it is not
directly enforceable in domestic law without further action by Congress.1 7 0 Given non-self-executing treaties and no further action by
Congress, the President is implicitly prohibited from unilaterally making those treaty obligations enforceable in domestic law. 17 1
This conclusion confirms the strength of the presumption against
self-execution as a federalism limit. The presumption against self-execution rules out any immediate domestic legal effect without further
action by Congress. Although the Court emphasized the non-self-executing nature of ICJ decisions in both lines of inquiry, a mere pre25-26, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984). Justice Alito asked if the government's
theory would enable the President to "take any treaty that is ratified on the understanding that it's not self-executing and execute the treaty and give it force under
domestic law." Id. at 28.
166 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
167 Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
168 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367-68.
169 Id. at 1369.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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sumption against self-execution may not, in itself, be enough to
preclude executive enforcement in all cases.172 Instead, the Court
appears to apply this presumption against self-execution as a limit on
executive power-the President's Memorandum is not insufficient
simply because the treaty is non-self-executing, but because enforcement of the non-self-executing treaty has not been clearly authorized
by Congress. Put another way, it is conceivable that the President's
Memorandum could be viewed as either authorized by congressional
acquiescence to past executive enforcement actions or as presidential
action in the absence of either a grant or a denial of power.1 73
IV. WHAT

LIMITs SHOULD APPLY?

Is Medellin's presumption against self-executing treaties the correct limit to protect federalism from encroachment through the treaty
power? What plausible alternatives exist? It is to these questions that I
now turn.
A.

EvaluatingMedellin 's Limit

While Medellin does not explicitly overrule Missouri v. Holland, it
is not clear that it should be expected to.17 4 Proponents of the nationalist view of the treaty power will likely point to the Court's central
inquiry of whether or not an ICJ decision is self-executing under U.S.
law as implicitly reaffirming Missouri v. Holland. The Court does not
directly address the issue of congressional power, nor does it mention
Missouri v. Holland. The determination that ICJ judgments, although
international obligations, are non-self-executing is sufficient to deny
Medellin's requested relief. But while the possibility remains that
Congress could simply pass legislation making the ICJ's ruling in
Avena a binding rule of decision for federal courts, the Court holds
that the combined force of a valid international obligation and the
executive branch's efforts to comply are insufficient to displace state
172 See, e.g., Hollis, supranote 79, at 1388 (suggesting a broader role for the executive branch in the implementation and enforcement of treaties as a means of protecting states' interests).
173 Indeed, the United States argued that the President's Memorandum fell within
one of the first two categories of the Youngstown framework. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at
1368; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 165, at 35-36.
174 See Swaine, supra note 92, at 422 ("The Court may, in any event, be able to
humble Holland without overturning it."); see also Hollis, supra note 79, at 1352-53
("[Bloth the nationalists and new federalists are wrong to view their debate solely
through ajudicial lens.... [T] he real issue today is how the executive branch regards
the treaty power. Its views will largely determine that power's future scope.").
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procedural rules. This in itself seems to be reason enough for new
federalists to view Medellin favorably.
Despite the Court's silence on the issue of congressional power,
there should be no doubt over the federalism values at stake in Medellin. Medellfn claimed that Avena enjoined the operation of state law
and required Texas to provide "review and reconsideration" of his
case.' 75 Rejecting the claim that Congress had acquiesced to executive enforcement of earlier ICJ controversies, the majority noted that
"none of [the earlier exercises of Presidential authority] remotely
involved transforming an international obligation into domestic law
and thereby displacing state law."1 76 The concurrence by Justice Stevens suggested that "States must shoulder the primary responsibility
for protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation" in giving effect
to international obligations.' 7 7
Even without directly addressing the central problem of Missoui
v. Holland, the Medellin decision does provide a federalism limit on the
treaty power. By adopting a presumption against self-executing treaties, Medellin amounts to a preservation of state law absent a clear congressional statement to the contrary. Congress still has the power to
make such a statement, either by the Senate's advice and consent
encouraging the Executive to pursue a self-executing treaty or by passing implementing legislation for a non-self-executing treaty. That
Congress retains such power may suggest that a presumption against
self-executing treaties is a fairly weak federalism limit, but in substance
this is no weaker a limit on the treaty power than analogous limits on
the commerce power after Raich.178 A presumption against self-executing treaties seems to fit the description of a new federalist
approach to the treaty power-greater consideration of state law
interests while leaving the broad power of the federal government relatively unchanged.
The strength of Medellin's presumption against self-executing
treaties, however, is the constraint placed on the executive branch in
enforcement. 179 In order to enforce an international obligation as
175 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1366.
176 Id. at 1370.
177 Id. at 1374 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178 See supra Part III.A.
179 Indeed, newspaper reports focused on the limitation on presidential power.
See Robert Barnes, justices Rebuff Bush and World Court, WASH. PosT, Mar. 26, 2008, at
Al ("The Supreme Court yesterday issued a broad ruling limiting presidential power
and the reach of international treaties, saying neither President Bush nor the World
Court has the authority to order a Texas court to reopen a death penalty case involving a foreign national."); David Stout, justices Rule Against Bush on Death Penalty Case,
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domestic law, the executive branch must have the clear consent of the
legislature, whether the treaty is self-executing or not.18 0 This may
seem to be an unremarkable limit, but it is outcome determinative in
Medellin: the presumption leads the Court to conclude that the treaties at issue were non-self-executing, and as a result, they cannot be
enforced even with the President's support.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion objected to the majority's
determination that the treaties create "a legal obligation that binds
the United States internationally, but which, for Supremacy Clause
purposes, is not automatically enforceable as domestic law."' 8 1 Justice
Breyer found little support in earlier cases for a presumption against
self-execution and argued that the Supremacy Clause itself applied
many treaty provisions directly to the states.18 2 Absent such a presumption, Justice Breyer argued that the treaties were self-executing
and "the President has correctly determined that Congress need not
enact additional legislation." 8 3 If the treaties had been self-executing, then the President's Memorandum would have been more likely
to fall within the first category of Youngstown as an exercise of the
combined powers of Congress and the President.
But assuming that the treaties were non-self-executing, the majority argued that the President lacked the power to give legal effect to
Avena in domestic courts. The Court framed this as a separation of
powers issue: "' [t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress;
the power to execute in the President." 8 4 Even so, the same concerns that drove the presumption against self-execution are applicable
here. In essence, the Medellin Court is requiring a clear statement
from Congress before an international obligation can displace state
law. This echoes the usual presumption against preemption that
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.conm/2008/03/25/washington/25cndtexas.html ("[T]he Supreme Court declared on Tuesday that President George W.
Bush had no power to tell the State of Texas to reopen the case of a Mexican who has
been condemned for murder and rape.").
180 For a self-executing treaty, the Senate's advice and consent in ratifying the
treaty are sufficient for this purpose. For a non-self-executing treaty, the Executive
must seek the consent of both houses in the form of implementing legislation.
181 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 1380-81 ("The many treaty provisions that this Court has found selfexecuting contain no textual language on the point.... Indeed, the majority does
not point to a single ratified United States treaty that contains the kind of 'clea[r]' or
'plai[n]' textual indication for which the majority searches." (alterations in original)
(quoting id. at 1363, 1368 (majority opinion))).
183 Id. at 1377.
184 Id. at 1369 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006)).
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applies to conflicts between state and federal law, but it seems to operate in a broader context here. Under Medellin, state procedural laws
can withstand the combined preemptive force of statements by Congress in the form of ratified treaty obligations, a ruling by the ICJ
under the compulsory jurisdiction granted by those treaties, and the
active efforts of the Executive to enforce this particular judgment.
B. Alternatives to Medellin
The presumption against self-executing treaties in Medellin was by
no means the only possible federalism limit on the treaty power, but
as discussed above in Part IV, Medellin was a step in the right direction.
To illustrate this, a brief consideration of alternatives is helpful.
1. Internal Limits
Recalling the earlier comparison of the treaty power to the commerce power, one option would be to look for "internal limits" on
treatymaking. Just as the definition of the word "commerce" acts as a
limit on the exercise of the commerce power, similar internal limits
could be imposed on the treaty power.
Textually, this is a difficult proposition. "[The President] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur
...

."5 The only word from which to build an internal limit is "trea-

ties," but the accepted definition of the term is fairly broad: a treaty is
"'an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation.'" 8 6 This definition lacks any limit on the subject matter or purpose of a treaty, so it is difficult to see how an internal limits approach could work for the treaty power.
Even more than the concept of commerce, the concept of treaties
has expanded dramatically since the founding era. Just as interstate
commerce was a fairly limited category in 1789, so too were the typical
subjects of international agreements.'8 7 The Founders envisioned
U.S. CoNsi. alt. II, S 2, para. 2.
AusT, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 16 (2d ed. 2007) (quoting
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333). For a discussion of each element of this definition, see

185
186

ANTHONY

id. at 17-24.
187 See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545, 587 (2004) ("That the Constitution specifically
carries forward the foreign affairs powers listed in the Articles of Confederation ...
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treaties as dealing primarily with questions of war, peace, and commerce.1 88 Yet today, there are a bewildering variety of complex treaty
regimes reaching everything from economic development to human
rights.' 8 9 This variety reinforces the difficulty (if not outright impossibility) of finding any internal limit on the treaty power.19 0
2.

Enumerated Powers

Professor Bradley suggests limiting the permissible subjects of the
treaty power to the enumerated powers of Congress.1 9 1 At a minimum, limiting treaties to the enumerated powers of Congress would
mean parity with federal legislation.19 2 This approach has the benefit
of addressing the central problem of Missouri v. Holland.
However, this argument is flawed from a textual perspective. The
enumerated powers of Congress appear in Article I, while the power
to make treaties appears in Article II, suggesting that the former does
not apply to the latter. The contemplated role for Congress in
treatymaking is limited to the advice and consent of the Senate, while
the President (to whom the limits of Article I do not apply) is vested
with the power to make treaties. As a textual matter, there is simply
no room for any argument that the President and the Senate must
adhere to Article I limits when entering into a self-executing treaty. 193
3.

Eliminating the Distinction Between Self-Executing and NonSelf-Executing Treaties

A more drastic solution might be to eliminate the distinction
between self-executing treaties and non-self-executing treaties
further undercuts the assertion that the Founders would have perceived some undefined package of foreign affairs powers . . . .").
188 See id. at 560-61 (describing the Founders' exposure toJohn Locke's theory on
the division of government power, which classified dealings in war and peace and
transactions outside of the commonwealth as federative power, distinct from legislative power and executive power).

189 See Thomas M. Franck, Can the United States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International Regimes?, in DELEGATING STATE POWERS 1, 3 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000)
("America's ... constitutional scheme does not fit easily the exigencies of the growing
system of supranational regimes.").
190 See White, supra note 36, at 69 (recognizing that the expansive scope of
national interests today confirms the breadth of the treaty power).
191 Bradley, supra note 80, at 456-61.
192 Id.
193 While this argument is flawed in the context of self-executing treaties, the same
does not hold true for non-self-executing treaties. The central problem of Missoui v.
Holland was the rejection of enumerated power limits on Congress in passing legislation for implementing non-self-executing treaties.
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entirely. If the presumption against self-executing treaties in Medellin
is too easily overridden to adequately protect federalism, this limit
could be strengthened by adopting a general rule against self-executing treaties. In effect, this would require all treaties entered into by
the United States to be non-self-executing.19 4 Implementing legislation would be necessary in every case where an international obligation displaces state law.19 5 While this approach has the advantage of
certainty, the additional hurdle could harm the appearance of the
United States as a desirable partner for international agreements.
The bigger problem with a rule (rather than a presumption)
against self-executing treaties is that it reduces treaties to mere legislation.1 96 Treaties and federal statutes are treated equally under the
Supremacy Clause, but the Constitution describes distinct procedures
for creating each. Article II vests the President with the ability to
enter into treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. It seems
unlikely that the Framers would have set the treaty power apart from
the legislative powers of Congress in this way if implementing legislation were required in every case.
Instead of a general rule against self-executing treaties, there
could instead be a federalism limit in the opposite rule-all treaties
must be self-executing.19 7 This, too, would remove the issue of domestic enforceability of international obligations from courts, but rather
than concentrating the decision in the legislative branch, this
approach focuses more on the executive. To be sure, Congress would
retain a role in this determination through the Senate's advice and
consent, but the power to enforce international obligations would
stem primarily from the efforts of the executive branch in negotiating
194 See generally Yoo, supra note 92 (arguing for a default rule of non-selfexecution).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
196 Treaties are, of course, distinct from legislation in that they involve partnerships with foreign nations and do not follow the bicameralism and presentment process of Article I legislation. Even so, a rule against self-execution would mean that no
treaty has any effect on domestic law absent implementing legislation-that treaties
have no domestic effect unless their terms are also subjected to usual bicameralism
and presentment.
197 Cailos Vdzquez does not arguc for a flat rule of self-execution, but he does
suggest that non-self-executing treaties operate only in four narrow situations. See
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695 (1995). Vzquez suggests that these situations arise when the treaty's authors
specifically intend further legislation prior to implementation, the treaty addresses its
object as a "constitutional matter," the treaty aims at a goal which the Constitution
requires be promulgated by statute, or the plaintiff seeking enforcement is left without a cause of action in the absence of a statute. Id. at 696-97.
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and framing treaties. If all international obligations are directly
enforceable in domestic law, then Congress cannot use a treaty or the
need to implement a treaty to justify exceeding the limits of its enumerated powers.
Although this approach solves the Missouri v. Holland problem,
the cost is too high. Congress will be restrained from enlarging its
legislative powers by treaty, but it is not clear that there is any federalism limit regarding the displacement of state law. While it may once
have been true that the Senate's advice and consent on a proposed
treaty was sufficient to protect state interests, today's Senate is no
longer the institutional protector of state interests that it was originally
conceived to be.' 9 8 With the direct election of senators, the Senate
now reflects the interests of the people of each state rather than those
of the state government. While these interests will often coincide, the
incentive to protect states from federal overreaching is certainly
diminished.
4.

No Judicially Enforceable Federalism Limits

Under Missouri v. Holland, there appear to be no federalism limits on the treaty power.19 9 While it is troubling in theory that Congress could exceed the limits on its enumerated powers, effectively
increasing its own power through the passage of a treaty, this has not
been particularly problematic in practice.
One explanation for this may be the willingness of both the legislative and executive branches to themselves enforce limits on the
treaty power. Duncan Hollis has argued that the executive branch is
particularly suited to the role of enforcing federalism limits on the
treaty power. 200
Neither the public nor Congress seems to be seriously concerned
with any threat posed by Missouri v. Holland. While Congress did show
some passing interest in amending the Constitution to limit the permissible uses of the treaty power, 20 1 little effort has been made to over198

See John W. Truslow III, Senate Vacancies Raise Questions of Framers' Intentions,
CALL (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 5, 2009, at 4 ("While a Member of the House would
represent the interests of the people as citizens, a Senator would represent the very
different interests of the people's sovereign state governments. . . . The legislature
would domicile two distinct powers (the people and the states) to compete bill by bill
for the direction and scope of the federal government.").
199 See supra Part I.B-C.
200 See Hollis, supra note 79, at 1388.
201 For a detailed account of SenatorJohn Bricker's attempts to amend the Constitution in favor of a more limited treaty power, see LocH K JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTs 85-110 (1984).
ROLL

2010]

BEYOND

MEDELLIN

1193

turn the result of the case since. 20 2 Instead, the executive and
legislative branches have responded to concerns about overreach in
the treaty power on a case-by-case basis-most notably, the United
States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention
following Avena, ensuring that the United States will not be faced with
future ICJ opinions regarding rights under the Vienna Convention.20 3
Nor does the absence of any federalism limit on the treaty power
mean that the treaty power is unlimited. Justice Holmes himself
insisted in Missouri v. Holland that the Court did not endorse an
unlimited treaty power, but only the proposition that the Tenth
Amendment was not the correct limit.20 4 The Court left open the possibility that individual rights provisions could limit the treaty power,
and later cases confirmed this. 205
C.

Beyond Medellin: Joining the Presumption Against Self-Execution with
a Limit on CongressionalPower

Medellin's presumption against self-execution may provide some
protection of state interests from encroachment by federal treaties.
Although Medellin serves primarily as a constraint on enforcement by
the executive branch, it is a useful starting point for a federalism limit
on the treaty power. However, the problem of Missouri v. Holland
remains. In fact, Medellin's presumption against self-executing treaties
likely means that more treaties will be non-self-executing, thereby raising the problem of congressional power to pass implementing legislation more often than before.
An effective federalism limit on the treaty power must strike an
appropriate balance between the nature of our federal system and the
Executive's practical need for broad authority to conduct foreign
affairs. As the preceding discussion makes clear, none of the proposed solutions are individually capable of satisfying this criterion.
The Treaty Clause does not appear to have any internal limit. Simply
202 See TUSHNET, supra note 71, at 250 ("Liberal activists tried to get Democrats in
Congress to understand that the federalism revolution was a real threat to congressional power generally. They discovered that members of Congress cared about particular issues ... but rarely cared about the questions of political theory raised by the
Rehnquist Court's federalism deridomnn"I
203 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008).
204 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
205 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) ("[T]he fact that an interest is
recognized in international law does not automatically render that interest 'compelling' for purposes of First Amendment analysis."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19
(1957) (holding that the requirements of the Fifth Amendment limit the treaty
power).
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applying the limits applicable to the enumerated powers of Congress
disregards the constitutional text's specific adoption of distinct procedures for legislation and treatymaking. Requiring all treaties to be
self-executing would mean that virtually any international obligation
would displace state law; requiring all treaties to be non-self-executing
would unduly hamper the Executive's ability to conduct foreign
affairs.
To arrive at the ideal solution, we must consider the possibility
that the limits on the power to make self-executing treaties are different from the limits on the power to make non-self-executing treaties. 206 Once self-executing and non-self-executing treaties are
decoupled, a hybrid solution may be crafted. Such a solution allows
both the nationalist and new federalist concepts of the treaty power to
operate within their own spheres-the nationalist approach for selfexecuting treaties and the new federalist approach for non-self-executing treaties.
Medellin provides an excellent starting point in its presumption
against self-executing treaties. Regardless of whether a treaty is ultimately determined to be self-executing or not, this presumption
requires a clear statement from Congress prior to enforcement. 207
For non-self-executing treaties, federalism concerns are best
addressed by abandoning the rule of Missouri v. Holland. While the
President may conclude a non-self-executing treaty on any subject, the
power of Congress to pass legislation implementing such a treaty must
be limited to the powers enumerated in Article I.208 This will prevent
future governments from seeking to increase the power of Congress
by treaty rather than by constitutional amendment. While this may
not provide much protection for state law in light of the broad scope
206 Of course, the Constitution itself makes no distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties. The distinctions proposed here are entirely consistent with this premise. Regardless of whether or not a treaty is self-executing, the
same Article II treatymaking process is followed. The differences arise in the additional step of passing implementing legislation for non-self-executing treaties.
207 Such a statement would come in the form of the Senate's ratification of a
clearly self-executing treaty or from the passage of implementing legislation by both
houses in the case of a non-self-executing treaty. See supra note 180.
208 This adopts Professor Bradley's solution of limiting the treaty power to the
enumerated powers of Congress, but only to the extent that such a limit is consistent
with the constitutional text. See supra Part IV.B.2. This also draws support from
Rosenkranz's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as authorizing the
laws necessary and proper to execute the power to make treaties but not allowing
Congress to legislate beyond the scope of its enumerated powers to carry treaty obligations into effect. See Rosenkranz, supra note 29, at 1880-92.
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of the federal legislative power, it would preclude the type of bad faith
use of the treaty power seen in Missouri v. Holland.
For self-executing treaties, no additional federalism limit is necessary.20 9 Aside from constitutional provisions protecting individual
rights, there is no need for an additional limit. This preserves the
President's power to negotiate and conclude treaties in most cases.
The existing limits of individual rights and the advice and consent of
the Senate remain in effect. It is possible that self-executing treaties
will encroach upon and even displace state law in some cases, but this
is simply the price of the Seventeenth Amendment. By amending the
Constitution to provide for the direct election of senators, the people
have eliminated the primary federalism limit on the treaty power from
the original Constitution. As a result, state interests are protected
only by political limits. However, since courts will not presume that a
treaty is self-executing absent clear evidence, the limits on non-selfexecuting treaties are likely more important.
By recognizing that the nationalist and new federalist concepts of
the treaty power coexist, this approach combines the flexibility that
the executive branch needs to conduct foreign affairs with an insistence that the power of Congress has limits even when legislating pursuant to a treaty. These principles are bolstered by Medellin's
presumption against self-executing treaties. In most cases, treaty obligations will concern issues within the enumerated powers of Congress,
and will be made directly enforceable by the passage of implementing
legislation. Where Congress lacks the power to legislate or where the
President otherwise desires, the federal government can enter into a
self-executing treaty. In theory, the presumption against self-executing treaties will require the President to be clear in negotiating the
treaty and in seeking ratification in the Senate-states and senators
will be aware that the treaty will be directly enforceable in domestic
law. 2 10
209 This essentially endorses the nationalist view of the treaty power as a virtually
unqualified grant of power vested entirely in the President and the Senate. See
Golove, supra note 23, at 1089-91. However, the nationalist concept of the treaty
power should operate only in the context of self-executing treaties, and the expansive
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause championed by Professor Golove should
be rejected.
210 This could also have the added benefit of making the United States a more
desirable treaty partner for other countries. To get around the presumption against
self-executing treaties, the President will need to ensure that the text of the treaty
makes its enforceability in domestic law clear. Our treaty partners will immediately
know whether they can rely on the United States to comply-the difference between
political promises and legal promises will be apparent.
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CONCLUSION

Under Missoui v. Holland, Congress has the power to pass legislation to implement a valid treaty even when it would have lacked the
power to pass the same law in the absence of a treaty. The conclusion
that Congress can increase its own power through treaty implementation should be deeply troubling. Despite the potential threat to federalism values, Missoui v. Hollandhas now stood for nearly ninety years.
In the time since it was originally decided, the limits of federalism
on the commerce power have fallen and risen again. With the return
of federalism limits to the commerce power and to other areas of law,
scholars have suggested that federalism limits could and should apply
to the power to make treaties.
A federalism limit has emerged in the form of a presumption
against self-executing treaties. Faced with treaty obligations to comply
with the ICJ's judgment in Avena, the Supreme Court instead determined that decisions of the ICJ are not directly enforceable in domestic law. This presumption constrains the executive branch in the
enforcement of international obligations, but does not address the
power of Congress to pass implementing legislation. While Medellin is
a step in the right direction and compares favorably with limits on the
commerce power, courts must go beyond Medellin. To effectively balance the protection of state interests and the President's authority in
foreign affairs, we must recognize that the treaty power allows for
operation of both the nationalist and new federalist approaches. By
combining the presumption against self-executing treaties with an
enumerated-powers limitation on the power of Congress to pass
implementing legislation, the treaty power will better protect state
interests and prevent the federal government's bad faith use of the
treaty power to circumvent the constitutional amendment process.
Until then, the specter of Missouri v. Hollandwill remain.

